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NOTES
Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfers
THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR frequently finds himself at a serious
disadvantage when attempting to exploit a patent on his own.
Accordingly, he may choose to license or assign his rights in a patent
to another individual or business which is more capable of utilizing
the patent as a valuable income-producing item.
Gain realized from a license or an assignment of patent rights
is taxable as income' but may be accorded beneficial treatment as
long-term capital gain if the transaction falls within one of three
categories. First, if a "holder" transfers, within the meaning of sec-
tion 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code, all substantial rights or
an undivided interest in a patent to anyone except a "related per-
son," the transfer is considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for six months regardless of how long the patent has actually
been held.2 Second, if the patent qualifies as a capital asset within
section 1221 and is held for six months prior to sale, the seller will
receive capital gains treatment. To qualify as a capital asset, the
patent must not be stock-in-trade, includable in inventory, held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, or
depreciable property used in a trade or business.' Finally, if the
patent constitutes property used in the taxpayer's trade or business
within section 1231, capital gains treatment is also available. To
qualify, the patent must be held for more than six months, be sub-
ject to depreciation under section 167, and not properly includable
in inventory or held primarily for sale.4
It is the purpose of this Note to discuss the tax consequences
of transfers to which the above rules are applicable. In the course
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE Q].
2 CODE § 1235. See 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 22.134-.137
(1958); Farber, Capital Gains - "'Transfer... of Property Consisting of All Substan-
tial Rights to a Patent," 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 981 (1965); Kurtz, Distinctions Be-
tween License and Capital Transactions on Transfer of Patent, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON
FED. TAX 135 (1965); Mann, Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfers, 44 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 97 (1962); Mann, Summary of Prevailing Case Law on Tax Aspects of
Sales or Exchanges of Patent Rights, 40 TAXES 767 (1962); Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1010 (1961).
3 CODE §§ 1221, 1223. See 3B MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 22.133; Mann,
Capital Asset Status of Patents and Inventions Under General I.R.C. Sections 1221-
1223, 42 TAXES 317 (1964).
4 See, 3B MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 22.133; Porter, Capital Gains on Pat-
ents Without Benefit of Section 1235, 41 TAxEs 800 (1963).
PATENT TRANSFERS
of this discussion, an attempt will be made to resolve the apparent
inconsistencies in the treatment of transfers under section 1235 and
transfers under either section 1221 or section 1231. In addition,
the discussion will include a review of the interpretation and appli-
cability of the various Code sections as developed by the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts.
I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
OF SECTION 1235
Section 1235 provides that a transfer (other than by gift, inheri-
tance, or devise) of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided
interest therein, by any holder, shall be considered the sale or ex-
change of a capital asset held for more than six months regardless
of the fact that payments in consideration of such transfer might be
payable periodically or be contingent upon the productivity, use, or
disposition of the property transferred. Excepted from this general
rule are transfers by nonholders and transfers to related persons.'
A. All Substantial Rights
There is no precise definition of what constitutes "all substan-
tial rights" to a patent;' rather, it is said that the circumstances of
the whole transaction, rather than the particular terminology used
in the instrument of transfer, must be considered.' Thus, the ques-
tion of what is substantial is often considered to be factual;' how-
5 Transactions involving these circumstances will be discussed in later sections. See
text accompanying notes 57-64 infra.
6 The section does not detail precisely what constitutes the formal compo-
nents of a sale or exchange of patent rights beyond requiring that all substan-
tial rights evidenced by the patent... should be transferred to the transferee
for consideration.... It is the intention of your committee to continue this
realistic test, whereby the entire transaction, regardless of formalities, should
be examined in its factual context to determine whether or not substantially
all rights of the owner in the patent property have been released to the trans-
feree, rather than recognizing less relevant verbal touchstones. 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5082-83 discussing S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 439-40 (1954).
See, e.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 656 (8th Cit. 1960).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. REV.
BULL No. 44, at 9. [hereinafter cited as Reg. f].
8 Lawrence v. United States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cit. 1957), in which it is said:
"What is 'substantial' often becomes a factual question to be decided according to the
facts and circumstances of each case and the peculiarities inherent in each patent." Id.
at 545.
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ever, at least one court has held this determination to be a question
of law.'
The Commissioner has defined "all substantial rights" to mean
"all rights ... which are of value at the time the rights to the patent
: . . are transferred."'" The former treasury regulation contain-
ing this definition excluded grants which were limited in duration
to less than the life of the patent. A recent amendment also ex-
cludes those grants of patent rights which are (1) limited geograph-
ically, (2) limited to certain fields of use, and (3) limited to less
than all of the claims or inventions covered by the patent.1' Appar-
ently, the latter two categories of transfers are not excluded if they
are grants of all rights which exist and have value at the time of the
grant. 2 This would follow from a literal interpretation of the
treasury regulations but will continue to be the subject of consider-
able controversy.
B. Undivided Interest
Long-term capital gains treatment is extended to the holder who
transfers an undivided interest in part of the substantial rights to a
patent. An undivided interest has been defined by the Commis-
sioner to be "the same fractional share of each and every substantial
right to the patent,"'" that is, a joint interest. In accord with the
legislative history of section 1235,"4 the Commissioner has taken the
9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bannister v. United States, 262 F.2d 175
(5th Cir. 1958), ruled: "It thus appears that the question decided below and to be
decided here is not one of fact but of law .. ." Id. at 176.
10 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. REV. BULL.
NO. 44, at 9 provides in part:
The term "all substantial rights to a patent" does not include a grant of
rights to a patent -
(i) Which is limited geographically within the country of issuance;
(ii) Which is limited in duration by the terms of the agreement to a
period less than the remaining life of the patent;
(iii) Which grants rights to the grantee, in fields of use within trades
or industries, which are less than all the rights covered by the patent, which
exist and have value at the time of the grant; or
(iv) Which grants to the grantee less than all the claims or inventions
covered by the patent which exist and have value at the time of the grant.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957).
14 "By 'undivided' a part of each property right represented by the patent (consti-
rating a fractional share of the whole patent) is meant (and not, for example, a lesser
interest such as a right to income, or a license limited geographically, or a license which
conveys some, but not all, of the claims or uses covered by the patent)." S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
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position that a transfer of an undivided interest in a patent is not ef-
fectuated by a transfer of a right to income, a license which is limited
geographically, a license which covers less than all valuable claims
or uses, or a transfer which is limited in duration to a period less
than the remaining life of the patent 5
C. Qualifications of a Holder
Section 1235 applies to any individual "whose efforts created
the patent property and who would qualify as the 'original and first'
inventor, or joint inventor"" under the patent laws. Benefits
are available as well to "any other individual who has acquired his
interest in such property in exchange for consideration in money or
money's worth paid to such creator prior to actual reduction to prac-
tice of the invention"" provided that such individual is neither
the employer of the creator nor related to the creator within the
meaning of section 1235 (d)." It makes no difference that the
creator or other qualified individual is in the business of making in-
ventions or of buying and selling patents.'9
Since section 1235 applies only to transferors who are individ-
uals, a corporation cannot qualify as a holder. Also, the regulations
clearly state that a partnership may not be a holder; however, "each
member of a partnership who is an individual may qualify as a
holder as to his share of a patent owned by the partnership."
15 Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957).
16Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (1) (i) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CuM.
BuLL 186.
1 7CODE3 § 1235(b). Regarding the requirement that consideration be given in
money or money's worth, the Senate Finance Committee explained that money's worth
means "consideration capable of present valuation in monetary terms .. ." S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1954). See Elmo Meiners, 42 T.C. 653, 142 U.S.P.Q.
114 (1964) in which favorable treatment was extended to one who had purchased an
invention before its reduction to practice.
As to the meaning of "reduction to practice," the treasury regulations provide
that the term has the same meaning as under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1964), and that
"generally, an invention is reduced to actual practice when it has been tested and op-
erated successfully under operating conditions." Reg. § 1.1235-2(e) (1957). For a
detailed discussion of the term see 1 WALKER, PATENTs § 103 (Deller's ed. 1937)
and cases cited therein.
18 This section incorporates the relationships of S 267 (b) including the spouse,
ancestors, lineal descendants, certain fiduciaries, and controlled corporations. Specifi-
cally excluded from the related party category are brothers and sisters who may become
holders.
19 Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (3) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CuM. BULL.
186.
2 0 Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (2) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL.
186.
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II. FACTORS AFFECTING THE APPLICABILITY
OF SECTION 1235
A. Factors No Longer Controlling
Certain provisions of a license agreement or assignment or the
particular terminology therein may at first appear to be incon-
sistent with the nature of a capital transaction, thereby precluding
the application of section 1235. However, the presence of only a
few of these factors will have no controlling effect, whereas the
presence of a number of these factors may be significant in reaching
the ultimate conclusion that income from the transfer is to be treated
as ordinary income rather than capital gain.
(1) Mode of Payment.-Payments made as considerations for
the transfer of patent rights are most often in the form of royalties
rather than lump sums. Since royalty payments appear inconsistent
with the transfer of all substantial rights, a problem has arisen con-
cerning whether these payments should be treated as capital gain.
In the 1946 case of Edward C. Meyers,2 the Tax Court ruled that
royalties measured by the amount of sales of patented products may
be treated as capital gain. Subsequently, the Commissioner revoked
his initial acquiescence in this decision.22 This nonacquiesence led
to the enactment in 1954 of section 1235' and to the retroactive
enactment in 1956 of section 117(q) of the 1939 Code.24 Specifi-
cally, these sections provide that capital gains benefits may be ob-
tained regardless of the fact that the consideration is payable periodi-
cally during the transferee's use of the patent or is otherwise contin-
2 1 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
2 2 Initial acquiescence was reported in 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 3, and nonacquiescence
was reported in Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 9.
23 [I]n 1950 the prospect of continued litigation was engendered in this
area by the issuance of Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 9, in which
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue announced that he would thereafter
regard such assignments or licenses as "providing for the payment of royalties
taxable as ordinary income" if payment is measured by the production, sale,
or use of the property transferred or if it is payable periodically over a period
generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent. To obviate
the uncertainty caused by this mimeograph and to provide an incentive to
inventors to contribute to the welfare of the nation, your committee intends,
in subsection (a), to give statutory assurance to certain patent holders that
the sale of a patent (whether as an "assignment" or "exclusive license") shall
not be deemed not to constitute a "sale or exchange" for tax purposes solely
on account of the mode of payment. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
439 (1954).
2 4 See S. REP. No. 1941, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1956).
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gent upon its productivity, use, or disposition."3 Because of the
manifest opposition of Congress and the courts,26 the Commissioner
finally acquiesced in Meyers in 1958.27 Recently, the courts have
had no difficulty in extending capital gains treatment under section
1235 to payments which were based on a "per unit" measure" or
on monthly installments.
(2) Use of the Terms "Licensed" and Licensee." -- The tradi-
tional distinction between a license and an assignment ° is no longer
relevant to transfers which are otherwise within section 1235. Al-
though the courts still discuss the distinctions between a license and
an assignment in the income tax sense, the basic issue is whether all
substantial rights in a patent have been transferred. The circum-
stances of the transaction rather than the particular terminology
used in the instrument of transfer are now controlling.3' Thus,
the use of the terms "license" and "licensee" should be no bar to a
finding that all substantial rights have been transferred.
(3) Conditions Subsequent.-The legislative history of sec-
tions 1235 and 117 (q) clearly indicates that capital gains treatment
will be allowed despite the presence of clauses in the written agree-
ment that rights to the particular patent will revert to the transferor
on the occurrence of a condition subsequent." The courts have
treated transfers as a sale or exchange where the agreement provided
for termination upon default of a contract obligation by the trans-
feree, upon bankruptcy or receivership of the transferee, or upon an
2 5 CODE § 1235 (a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(q), ch. 464, 70 Star. 404
(1956).
26 Among numerous decisions in accord with Meyers are: Watson v. United States,
222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.
1955); Allen v. Weiner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cit. 1951); Herbert C. Johnson, 30 T.C.
675 (1958); Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957); Roy J. Champayne, 26 T.C. 634
(1956); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183 (1947).
27ReV. Rul. 353, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 408.
28 Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1964).
29 McCullough v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1964).
30 This distinction is set forth in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
For a discussion of the patent law distinctions between licenses and assignments see
ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS §§ 49-73 (3d ed. 1955).
31 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 44, at 9; Wing v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1960).32
"[R]etention by the transferor of rights in the property which are not of the
nature of rights evidenced by the patent and which are not inconsistent with the pas-
sage of ownership, such as . .. a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent
(e.g., a forfeiture on account of non-performance) are not to be considered as such a
retention as will defeat the applicability of this section." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 440 (1954).
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option of the transferee to terminate." In addition, the regulations
provide that a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent
may be retained by the holder, 4 since it will not be considered a
substantial right for the purposes of section 1235. However, the
retention by the holder of a right to terminate at will is substantial.a"
(4) Retention of Title or of a Security Interest.-The transferor
will often wish to be assured of a sound financial position and there-
fore may retain legal title to the patent as security. With this in
mind, the Senate Finance Committee expressed its desire not to re-
quire that title be transferred as a prerequisite to the transfer of "all
substantial rights." 6  Accordingly, the regulations provide that the
retention of legal title or of a security interest, such as a vendor's
lien, will not be considered substantial."
(5) Restriction on Alienation.-For economic reasons, the
transferor will necessarily be interested in the manner in which,
and by whom, the patent will be used. Consequently, the trans-
feror may impose certain restrictions upon the selection of subse-
quent transferees by the first transferee. Whether the presence of
such restrictions will preclude capital gains benefits is uncertain since
the regulations state only that it "may or may not be substantial, de-
pending upon the circumstances of the whole transaction."38  The
point of departure seems to hinge upon the amount of control re-
tained by the transferor over subsequent transferees."9 Thus, if con-
trol exceeds an amount necessary to protect the transferor's eco-
nomic interest, royalty payments might be treated as ordinary in-
come.
3 3 For a general discussion of conditions subsequent see Magnus v. Commissioner,
259 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958), and cases cited therein.
34 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (2) (ii) (1957).
35 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (4) (1957). But see William S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186,
141 U.S.P.Q. 419 (1964), nonacq., 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 45, at 5.
36 "The word 'title' is not employed because the retention of bare legal title in a
transaction involving an exclusive license may not represent the retention of a sub-
stantial right in the patent property by the transferor." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 439 (1954).
3 7 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (2) (1957).
3 8 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (3) (1957). It should be noted that this section applies
only to the retention of an "absolute right to prohibit sublicensing or subassign-
ment. . ." (Emphasis added.) Quaere as to the meaning of "absolute." See Oak Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1962); Watkins v. United States, 252 F.2d
722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958). In both of these cases, the restric-
tion upon further assignment or licensing of the patents was considered along with
other factors to defeat capital gains treatment.
39 See Leubsdorf v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 234 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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(6) Obligation to Defend and Prosecute for Infringement.
-Agreements transferring patent rights often include provisions
calling for the transferor's defense in or prosecution of infringe-
ment actions, for the joinder of the transferor in such actions, or for
the indemnification of transferees for damages incurred in such ac-
tions. It has been said that provisions of this type may be analogized
to the covenant to defend title, which is commonly used in convey-
ances of real estate.4" Usually, the presence of these provisions in
an agreement will not preclude capital gains benefits.41 Where both
parties have the right to sue,' 2 or where the transferee may file suit
in the transferor's name if he fails to sue,43 favorable treatment may
be had. Yet where the agreement contains other elements inconsis-
tent with th6 transfer of "all substantial rights," capital gains treat-
ment may be denied if the transferor expressly retains the right to
sue.44 Since the transfer of exclusive rights to a patent normally
includes the right to sue, it is advisable that such right be transferred
rather than retained.
B. Factors Which May Preclude the Application of Section 1235
There are a number of factors affecting patent transfers which
may of themselves preclude beneficial treatment. Accordingly, one
should be cautioned against their use unless the unfavorable results
are justified by other business considerations.
(1) Transferor's Option to Terminate.-If the transferor re-
tains an absolute option to terminate the transfer agreement, gain
from the transaction will usually be treated as ordinary income.45
40 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818, 822 (D.N.J. 1955).
41 Ibid. The court stated, 'rhere is no inconsistency between the passage of title
to a purchase of a patent and an obligation of the vendor to defend assaults upon the
purchaser's title and to make good his damages, if any, arising out of use of the supposed
rights conveyed." Id. at 822. See also Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689, 692
(10th Cit. 1955); Golconda Corp., 29 T.C. 506 (1957).
42 William S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186, 141 U.S.P.Q. 419 (1964), nonacq., 1965
INT. REV. BULL. No. 45, at 5; Thornton G. Graham, 26 T.C. 730 (1956).
43 Magnus v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958).
44A typical case is Oak Mfg. Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1962),
where the court held that "the right to control the prosecution of infringement suits
was another item in the substantial 'bundle of sticks' retained by Oak which prevents
the agreement from being considered a sale or transfer." Id. at 262. See also Schmitt
v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 301, 307 (9th Cir. 1959); Watkins v. United States, 252
F.2d 722, 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958).
45 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (4) (1957). In Young v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 89 (2d
Cir. 1959), the court held that capital gains benefits could not be sought under §
117(q) of the 1939 Code since the transferor had the right to terminate at his own
discretion rather than upon the happening of a future event.
However, the Fifth Circuit has allowed capital gains treatment in just such a situa-
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Ordinarily, beneficial treatment will be allowed where the trans-
feree has the option to terminate at will.46 In view of the detri-
mental tax consequences brought about by the transferor's right to
terminate at will, it would be advantageous to phrase a termination
provision in terms of the happening of some future event."
(2) Geographical Restrictions.-Regardless of whether there
may be compelling economic reasons for restricting a transfer to a
limited geographical area, the Commissioner has taken the position
that such a restriction is inconsistent with the transfer of an "un-
divided interest."'48 Nevertheless, it may be inferred from the word-
ing of the regulations that a geographically limited transfer may be
consistent with the transfer of all substantial rights if it represents a
transfer of "all rights which are of value at the time the rights to the
patent... are transferred."4 However, it is apparent that this view
has not yet been tested in the courts.
(3) Limitation to Certain Industries or Fields of Use.-The
regulations extend capital gains benefits to transfers limited to cer-
tain industries or fields of use if all valuable rights in the patent
existing at the time of transfer have been transferred,"0 and the ma-
jority of courts have adhered to this rule.5 In 1964 the Tax Court
don. Bannister v. United States, 262 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1958). The court of appeals
reversed the lower court's "holding that because Bannister had the option to cancel on
thirty days' notice the exclusive interest feature of the contract, this defeated the sale.
On the contrary, we think it clear that, as stated by Judge Bratton in Watson v. United
States ... this reservation in no manner changed the fact that there was in fact and in
law an effective sale, subject only to an optional condition which was never made ef-
fective." Id. at 178. However, one should be cautioned against reliance upon this de-
cision since its holding apparently rests upon cases in which the transferee rather than
the transferor was given the option to terminate.
4 8 Lawrence v. United States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957), in which the court
held:
Appellant makes the further objection that the agreement could be ter-
minated on the part of the licensee by giving thirty-days notice with or with-
out cause, and on the part of the licensor by giving sixty-days notice upon
default by the licensee. This court held... that the existence in the grantee
of a right of cancellation does not preclude the idea of a sale, and that the
possibility of termination by a licensor upon default of the licensee was a
condition subsequent which did not negate the sale of the invention. Id. at
545.
47 The right of the transferor to terminate on the happening of some future event
is no bar to capital gains benefits. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
48Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957).
49 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 44, at 9.
50Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957).
5 1 In Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1964), it was held that
"all substantial rights" had been transferred where there was no other feasible use for
the invention and there was no evidence that the rights retained by the transferor had
[VoL 17: 844
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decided William S. Rouvero52 which greatly liberalized the concept
of "all substantial rights." In that case it was held that, under sec-
tion 1235, a patent may be separated into different fields of applica-
tion, and that each field may be transferred to a different transferee
with each transfer qualifying under section 1235. In effect, the
court said that there may be a transfer of "all substantial rights"
notwithstanding that all rights of value at the time of the transfer
are not included in each transfer. Since this view represents an ex-
treme departure from the regulations, it is likely that the Commis-
sioner will continue to oppose similar treatment in this area.
(4) Transfer of Less Than All Claims.-The regulations pro-
vide that there must be a transfer of all the valuable claims to a
patent as a prerequisite to the transfer of all substantial rights.53
From the language of the regulations it may be inferred that a trans-
fer of less than all claims of a patent may qualify for section 1235
benefits if all claims of value at the time of transfer are included in
the transaction. In one case,"4 favorable treatment was extended
to a transfer of less than all claims, since it had been stipulated by
the parties that the species claims to the generic patent constituted
separate inventions.
(5) Duration Less Than the Remaining Life of the Patent.
-Most agreements transferring patent rights are drafted so as to
remain in effect for the duration of the life of the patent rights
transferred. Since the regulations specifically provide that a limi-
tation upon the effective duration of the agreement to a term less
than the remaining life of the patent is neither a transfer of all sub-
stantial rights" nor a transfer of an undivided interest," it would
be unwise for tax purposes to include such a restriction unless other
business considerations would compel a contrary decision.
any ascertainable fair market value at the time of the transfer. In Flanders v. United
States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1959), it was held that "all substantial rights"
had been transferred where it was unknown whether the patented artides had any "es-
tablished value" outside the aircraft industry at the time the original license was exe-
cuted. In Milton P. Laurent, Sr., 34 T.C. 385, 125 U.S.P.Q. 601 (1960), vonacq.,
1961-2 CuM. BULL. 6, it was held that "all substantial rights" had been transferred on
the assumption that no other "substantial use" existed.
5242 T.C 186, 141 U.S.P.Q. 419 (1964), mwacq., 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 45,
at 5. Dictum in this case would indicate that a transfer limited geographically should
also receive favorable treatment under § 1235.
5 3 Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957).
54 Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958).
55 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. RBV. BULL.
No. 44, at 9.
56Reg. § 1.1235(c) (1957).
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C. Specific Transactions Excluded From Section 1235 Benefits
A number of transactions do not fall within section 1235 simply
because of the nature of the particular transferee. Such a situation
may arise where the individual inventor wishes to transfer patent
rights to his employer or to a corporation.
(1) Transfers From Employees to Employers.--The em-
ployee-inventor will often enter into an employment contract where-
by he is obligated to assign all patent rights to his employer. Where
the employee receives a single consideration composed of compen-
sation for services and for the obligation to assign patents, it will be
difficult to establish that a particular sum has been received in re-
turn for the transfer of patent rights. In such a case, the entire con-
sideration will be treated as ordinary income." However, where
compensation for the transfer of patent rights has been distinctly al-
located among particular transactions, favorable treatment may be
obtained. 5
At first glance the regulations would appear to bar favorable
treatment to an employee who is required by contract to transfer
his rights in an invention to his employer. If payments received
by the employee are attributable to the transfer of all substantial
rights in a patent, rather than to services rendered, section 1235
would apply." This issue is regarded as a question of fact which
may be decided on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances of
employment, as well as whether the "amount of such payments de-
pends upon the production, sale, or use by, or the value to, the em-
ployer of the patent rights transferred by the employee.""°  In re-
cent cases decided by the Tax Court, the primary issue has been
whether the employee was "hired to invent." When this question
was answerable in the negative, capital gains benefits have been ob-
tained.6 Whether or not the employer already has a "shop right"
in the inventions is not considered to be of great significance.6
57 See, e.g., Stout v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1951); Kleinschmidt v.
United States, 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. Mass. 1956); Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138
(1956); Arthur N. Blum, 11 T.C. 101 (1948), affd, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950).
5 8 E.g., Hofferbert v. Briggs, 178 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1949); Pike v. United States,
101 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1951); William M. Kelly, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 855
(1947).
59 Reg. § 1.1235-1(c) (2) (1957).
60 Ibid.
6 1 In Thomas H. McClain, 40 T.C. 841 (1963), McClain was employed by Lock-
heed and agreed to assign inventions relating to his employer's business. Subsequently,
the employer announced that a percentage of income from the assigned patents would
be paid to McClain. Such payments were treated as capital gain, the court relying upon
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(2) Transfers to Controlled Corporations.--Because the in-
ventor will have a continuing economic interest in his patent after
its disposition and because of the various advantages available to
a business adopting the corporate form, he may desire to transfer
patent rights to a corporation in which he is a substantial share-
holder. However, a transfer between an individual and a corpora-
tion in which the inventor owns twenty-five per cent or more of the
outstanding stock is not a transfer to which section 1235 applies.3
For this purpose the constructive ownership rules of section 267 (c)
apply, thereby attributing to the inventor ownership of stock held by
certain family members or corporations, partnerships, or trusts in
which he has an interest.64 Accordingly, such situations should be
avoided if capital gains treatment is desired.
III. TREATMENT UNDER SECTIONS 1221 AND 1231
There are a number of situations in which the advantages of
the fact that McClain was not "hired to invent" and that substantial sums were paid in
consideration for the transfer of the patent. The case of T. Gardner, 32 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1199 (1963) involved another Lockheed employee. The court said:
It is of no consequence that the assignment was a condition precedent to
employment, or required, or deemed effective at the moment the invention
is conceived, or voluntarily made thereafter.... Where there is a transfer of
all the patent rights, the only issue is whether the amounts paid are 'in con-
sideration of such transfer' within the meaning of section 1235 .... Id. at
1205.
In Roland Chilton, 40 T.C. 552 (1963), there was no patent reward plan for em-
ployees when Chilton was hired. At Chilton's request an employment contract was
entered into under which Chilton's position was characterized as "Consulting Engineer"
and his obligation was to assign inventions relating to aircraft products to his employer.
The court emphasized that the crucial issue was whether Chilton was "hired to invent."
Answering this in the negative, payments for the transfer of patents were accorded
capital gains treatment. That Chilton was required to assign the patents was held to
be immaterial.
The above cases are discussed in Delbaum, Tax Court Brightens Capital Gains Pos-
sibilities for Employee-Inventors, 19 J. TAXATION 306 (1963) in which the following
conclusion was reached:
The Tax Court, at least, has little difficulty in finding the transfer and
considers the key question to be whether the employee is hired to invent.
As pointed out earlier, none of these cases deals with the honoraria paid
out, only with substantial payments.... It would appear that logically there
should be no difference between large and small payments, yet a court would
more likely find that payments of token size were not in consideration of the
transfer but were additional compensation in the form of bonuses. Id. at 307.
For a discussion of employee compensation plans see, Farber, Capital Gains-Trans-
fer of Property Consisting of All Substantial Rights to a Patent, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOcY
981, 991-97 (1965); McTiernan, Employee-Inventor Compensation Plans, 46 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 475 (1964).
62 Hans Jordan, 27 T.C. 265 (1956).
63 Reg. § 1.1235-2(f) (3) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CuM. BULL.
186. This applies to transfers subsequent to September 2, 1958.
64 CODE § 1235 (d).
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section 1235 may not be available, such as where the transferor is
not a "holder" or where the transferee is a "related person." Never-
theless, the regulations specifically provide that a transfer may still
qualify for capital gains treatment under other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code and that section 1235 should be disregarded
in determining whether the transfer constitutes the sale or exchange
of a capital asset. 5 Whether the transfer of patent rights may
qualify for favorable treatment under sections 1221 or 1231 de-
pends on three major factors: (1) the nature of the asset; (2)
whether the property has been held for six months; and (3) whether
the transfer qualifies as a sale or exchange. It should be noted at
the outset that depreciable property within the scope of section 1231
is excluded from treatment under section 1221. Yet both sections
are similar in requiring that the transaction involve a sale or ex-
change of property held for six months.
A. Nature of the Asset Under Section 1221
Generally, to qualify as section 1221 property, the patent or
invention must constitute a capital asset which is defined as
property held by the taxpayer, whether or not connected with his
trade or business, but excluding (1) stock-in-trade; (2) property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade
or business; or (3) property used in a trade or business subject to an
allowance for depreciation under section 167.6
The Commissioner most often applies the "frequency and conti-
nuity of sales" test to differentiate between capital and non-capital
assets. In utilizing this test, it is argued that the transferor has
previously sold or licensed other patents with such frequency and
continuity that the disposition of the property at hand cannot be re-
garded as the transfer of a capital asset. Where the transferor is
the inventor himself, the argument is made that he is a professional
inventor engaged in the business of developing patents for sale."
The principal authority upon which the Commissioner has con-
sistently relied is the case of Harold T. Avery, 8 in which the Tax
Court found that an owner of twelve patents, who had previously
sold three of the patents and had granted licenses on several of the
6 5 Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) (1957).
06 CoDE §§ 1221(1), (2).
6 7 Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538, 541-42 (1942).
68 Ibid.
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others, held the patents primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of business. However, the courts have been reluctant
to apply the doctrine of the Avery case except in a few subsequent
decisions 9 where the facts dearly warranted such drastic treatment.
Conversely, one who has previously sold or licensed patents
would not expect to be treated as a professional inventor if: (1) his
principal activity is something other than developing patents;7" (2)
his inventing activities are "intermittent and irregular;"'" or (3)
despite his status as a professional inventor, he has not licensed or
sold a significant number of patents,72 or the patent in question is
not within his limited field of activity." Although there has been
an apparent trend toward the liberal treatment of inventors, stricter
application of the test should be expected against those who do not
technically qualify as inventors.
One loophole that the professional inventor may take advantage
of to avoid loss of capital gains treatment involves the situation in
which he has licensed or assigned his patents to a corporation which
he controls. The position has been taken that the corporation is not
a "customer" if the transferor has a significant proprietary interest
in the transferee.' With no previous history of licenses or sales
which might preclude favorable treatment, subsequent sales may be
made of property which still qualifies as a capital asset.
B. Nature of the Asset Under Section 1231
Despite the fact that property used in a trade or business and
subject to an allowance for depredation under section 167 does not
qualify as a section 1221 "capital asset," it may nevertheless qualify
for capital gains treatment under section 1231. Whether a par-
ticular patent qualifies as a capital asset, or is held for sale to cUs-
6 9 Margaret L. Lockhart, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 402 (1957); Leo M. Harvey, 16
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 271 (1947), modified, 171 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949); Paul Smythe,
Jr., 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 927 (1942).
70 Beach v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Pike v. United
States, 101 F. Supp. 100, 102-03 (D. Conn. 1951); Harold F. Silver, 15 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 489, 498 (1956).
7 1 Harold F. Silver, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 489 (1956).
7 2 Evans v. Kavanagh, 86 F. Supp. 535 (ED. Mich. 1949), 4ad, 188 F.2d 234
(9th Cir. 1951).
73 First Natl Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (DN.J. 1955). In this case,
the inventor was considered a dealer in patents relating to optical goods but not a dealer
in patents relating to tooth brushes.
74 Harold F. Silver, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 489, 498 (1956).
75 COD]3 § 1231 (a).
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tomers, or is depreciable property used in a trade or business often
poses a difficult problem. Since these categories are mutually ex-
clusive, one will rarely have a choice as to what section of the Code
will apply. However, a particular patent may apparently qualify
under both sections 1231 and 1235. If losses are anticipated, one
might prefer to seek treatment under section 1231, since losses un-
der this section are ordinary losses,76 whereas section 1235 losses are
capital losses.
C. Holding Period
For tax purposes, the period during which a person holds the
rights to a patent begins with a reduction to practice.7" Once the
patent has qualified as a capital asset under section 1221 subject to
the six-month holding period requirement of section 1222, or once
the patent is considered section 1231 property subject to the six-
month holding period requirement of that section, one must then
determine whether the holding period requirement has in fact been
satisfied.79 This determination will in many instances begin with
an analysis of what constitutes a reduction to practice.
There are various views on the nature of the activity constitut-
ing a reduction to practice so as to commence the running of the
six-month period. The soundest view would appear to be that when
there is an actual, as opposed to a constructive, reduction to prac-
tice, the period should commence. Generally, this occurs when the
invention "has been tested and operated successfully under operating
conditions."8  Nevertheless, some courts have adopted the view
that the six-month period commences sometime prior to an actual
reduction to practice, such as when drawings have been completed
which would enable a person skilled in the art to construct the in-
vention.8 One court has expressed the view that the period com-
mences when the inventor has "a completed conception of his in-
vention and has ... actually expressed it in the form of drawings
76 Ibid.
77 This conclusion is reached from the language of § 1235 (a) that the transfer is
considered "the sale or exchange of a capital asset."
7 8 Carl G. Dreyman, 11 T.C. 153 (1948).
79CODE §§ 1222(3), 1231(a) both require that the property be held for six
months to be entitled to long term capital gains treatment.
S0Reg. § 1.1235-2(e) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 186.
Although this definition applies to § 1235, it is likely that it will be controlling as to
other sections of the Code as well.
81 Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
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and a machine."8 In addition, "tacking" may be permitted so that
the period during which the prior owner held the patent may be
tacked on to the period during which the taxpayer holds the patent,
if its acquisition was of such a nature that the taxpayer took the
prior owner's cost basis as his own basis for the patent.83
Generally, the holding period is considered to terminate upon
formal execution of an assignment of the patent or invention. 4
However, it has been held that this period terminated prior to
a formal execution of the assignment where it appears that the as-
signee has been given full control over the invention prior to the
formal grant."5
D. Sale or Exchange
The traditional test for determining whether the transfer of
patent rights constituted a sale or exchange for purposes of sections
1221 and 1231 was whether the transfer was an assignment or
license.88 If the transfer was an assignment, the payments received
were treated as capital gain.8" In contrast, if merely a license was
conferred, payments received by the transferor were treated as ordi-
nary income.8" In the case of Waterman v. Mackenzie," the United
States Supreme Court laid down the criteria for determining whether
a particular transfer constituted an assignment or license, and this
was controlling at least until section 1235 was adopted." Accord-
ing to these criteria, an assignment was effectuated by transferring
(1) an exclusive right under the whole patent, (2) an undivided
part of that exclusive right, or (3) an exclusive right in the patent
8 2 Franklin S. Speicher, 28 T.C. 938, 945 (1957).
8 3 CODE § 1223(2).
8 4 See Herbert Allen, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1952).
85 Paul L. Kuzmick, 11 T.C. 288 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 3.
8 8 See ELLIs, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS §§ 49, 55 (3d ed. 1955).
8 7 E.g., Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17, 36 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
8 8 E.g., Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953).
89 138 U.S. 252 (1891), in which the court set forth the traditional rule of an as-
signment as follows:
The monopoly thus granted is one entire thing, and cannot be divided into parts,
except as authorized by those laws. The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in
writing, assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive
right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States; or, 2d, undi-
vided part or share of that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent
within and throughout a specified part of the United States. Id. at 255.
90 The "substantial rights" test appears to be gaining recognition in section 1221
and 1231 cases.
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within a specified part of the United States. Anything less than this
was considered a mere license.
Presently, the law is not clear as to what constitutes a sale or
exchange for the purposes of sections 1221 or 1231. Some courts
apply the Waterman test,9 ' others the "substantial rights" test, 2 and
still others, a combination of the two." Applying the substantial
rights approach, the courts have recently permitted favorable treat-
ment where the transfer has been limited geographically94 or to
certain uses or industries, °5 or to less than all claims of the patent.96
Such a liberal trend in these areas would seem to indicate that simi-
lar treatment might also be available in cases governed by section
1235.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
THE VARiouS CATEGORIES OF TRANSFERS
The above analysis demonstrates that there are various advan-
tages and disadvantages in characterizing a transfer as falling within
either section 1235 or sections 1221 or 1231. The remainder of
this discussion will be devoted to pointing out distinctions between
the requirements of the various Code sections in order that capital
gains benefits as well as maximum flexibility in drafting the transfer
agreement may be obtained.
A. Section 1235
Among the advantages of section 1235 is, first, that the inventor
may disregard the problem of being characterized as a professional."
Second, since there is no holding period requirement, the inventor
need not worry about when a reduction to practice operates to com-
mence the running of a holding period, an especially troublesome
obstacle where there is a requirement that improvement patents be
9 1 United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955); Kavanaugh v. Evans,
188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951); Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1955).
92 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.N.J. 1955); Ernest
E. Rollman, 25 T.C. 481 (1955).
9 3 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
94 E.g., Moberg v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962); Gowdey v. Com-
missioner, 307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962).
95 United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1955).
96 Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958).
97 Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (3) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6394, 1959-2 Cum. BULL.
186.
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automatically transferred. Third, there is assurance that royalty
payments will not be treated as ordinary income, whereas a vestige
of this problem may yet remain under sections 1221 and 1231.98
The principal disadvantage of section 1235 is that only a limited
category of transferors will qualify. Corporations and persons who
are not otherwise "holders" are expressly excluded.9 Also, if the
transferee is a controlled corporation, the transfer will not qualify.' 0
Lastly, the "substantial rights" requirement is highly restrictive in
that it does not permit a transfer which is limited geographically,'0 '
but there is recent dictum to the contrary.0 2 A number of these dis-
advantages are nonexistent under sections 1221 and 1231.
B. Sections 1221 and 1231
A distinct advantage of sections 1221 and 1231 is that virtually
any transferor may obtain capital gains treatment subject to certain
limitations.0 3 The permissible categories of transferees are greatly
expanded. For example, one may transfer section 1231 property
to a corporation of which up to eighty per cent of the outstanding
stock is owned by the transferor.' Moreover, the sale or exchange
of section 1221 property may qualify for capital gains treatment re-
gardless of the extent of the transferor's ownership interest in the
transferee. Equally important is the fact that transfers which are
limited geographically may receive beneficial treatment.' 5
98 See Kurtz, Distinctions Between License and Capital Transaction on Transfer of
Patent, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON FED. TAX 135 (1965) in which Mr. Kurtz is of the
opinion that Commissioner v. Brown, 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963), al'd, 380 U.S.
563 (1965), may have some effect on the patent area. There the government lost a
non-patent case in which it took the position that periodic payments should not be ac-
corded capital gains treatment.
9 9 This is so, since the primary purpose of § 1235 was to aid the individual inventor.
'
0 0 For the purposes of § 1235 the transferor may not own more than 25% in value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation.
10 1 Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6852, 1965 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 44, at 9.
10 2 In William S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186, 141 U.S.P.Q. 419 (1964), nonacq., 1965
INT. Rnv. BULL. No. 45, at 5, the Tax Court quoted from Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261
F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958), to the effect that one owning a single invention patent may
"sel1' its use in a particular territory.
103 The primary limitation is being characterized as a professional inventor.
104 CODE § 1239.
105M oberg v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962); Estate of Gowdey v.
Commissioner, 307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Commissioner,
250 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1957); Thornton G. Graham, 26 T.C. 730 (1956). See
also Schmitt v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1959); Watson v. United
States, 222 F.2d 689, 690 (10th Cir. 1955).
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The two most formidable barriers to beneficial treatment are the
holding period and the characterization of the inventor as a profes-
sional. These barriers are frequently the reason for seeking benefits
under section 1235. However, because of the limited nature of sec-
tion 1235, capital gains benefits may be unavailable, and the tax-
payer will be compelled to report his gain from the transfer of
patent rights as ordinary income.
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing one may ascertain that there is a disparity
between the tax treatment available under section 1235 and that
available under sections 1221 and 1231. It is quite evident that
the extension of capital gains treatment is much more liberal under
the latter sections. But since the purpose of section 1235 was to
promote inventive activity, this disparity appears to be unjustified.'
In view of this situation, it is submitted that section 1235 be
amended to afford the benefits obtainable under sections 1221 and
1231. This may be implemented by the adoption of rules analogous
to the elements of a transfer announced in Waterman."°7 In so
doing, the purposes of section 1235 and the business needs of the
individual inventor will be more fully realized.
DAVID R. WILLIAMS
106 There is also the often quoted phrase: "Certainly the courts have been quick to
heed Congress' invitation to construe liberally sections 117(q) and 1235." Young v.
Commissioner, 269 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cit. 1959).
107 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 89, 90 supra.
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